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INTRODUCTION
There’s no such thing as a free lunch.1 There’s also no such
thing as free trade. But there is freer trade. Indeed, the last few
decades have seen an almost universal movement towards
enhanced trade agreements, both among regional blocs and on a
global basis. The United States has been an enthusiastic
participant regionally, e.g., as a member economy of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (“APEC”), and globally, e.g., as a member
of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and a signatory to its
many agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPs”).2

1

MILTON FRIEDMAN, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH (Open Court 1975);
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 162 (1966) (“There ain’t no such
thing as a free lunch”). Both authors helped popularize the expression, which dates to at
least the 1930’s. Milton Friedman, Wikiquote, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Milton_
Friedman (last visited October 11, 2006).
2
The gradual global progress toward free trade began in the United States in the
1930’s when Franklin Roosevelt introduced the Trade Agreements Program.
International negotiations and agreements have always been a seminal component of the
U.S. initiative. See Paul Krugman, Enemies of the WTO: Bonus Arguments Against the
World Trade Organization, SLATE, November 24, 1999, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/56497.
See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO—PRINCIPLES OF THE TRADING SYSTEM (2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.
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The fundamental objective of these trade agreements is clear
and praiseworthy—to enhance the efficiency of markets, thereby
creating more competitive and profitable industries and better
values for consumers. It has generally been understood that there
have been and will continue to be certain unavoidable adjustments
of labor activity as the larger markets rationalize. However, there
has been a growing and increasingly significant concern in the
United States that many jobs are disappearing as work is being
outsourced, not simply as an adjustment to changing markets but to
markets that are being skewed by foreign and, in some cases,
domestic laws or jurisprudence, which may not fully or adequately
reflect the increasingly international nature of the industries
affected by these laws.
I. BACKGROUND: GLOBALIZATION AND
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The outsourcing of jobs and technology is a particularly
sensitive issue facing the U.S. economy today. The drug
development activities of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry offer an
instructive case study to contextualize the situation. The U.S.
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most productive and
competitive industries in the world. Pharmaceutical research is an
activity of utmost importance to this country. Sustaining its
growth in the United States is considered fundamental to both the
health care system and the economy. Outsourcing threatens to
move the drug development segment of this industry and its
technology and jobs outside of the United States.
Over the last quarter century, a multinational diffusion of
individual pharmaceutical firms has rendered the term the “U.S.
pharmaceutical industry” a misnomer.3 Multinational firms are
becoming the norm. Most large U.S.-based firms now have
extensive facilities in foreign markets and many foreign-based

3

THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S.
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: THE INFLUENCES OF TECHNOLOGY IN DETERMINING
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 21 (1983).
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firms have extensive operations in the United States.4 The
intensely competitive nature of this “globalized” pharmaceutical
industry makes product innovation and development a crucial
determinant of any company’s success, inside or outside the United
States.
Pharmaceutical companies today are challenged by the time
and cost required to bring novel, branded drug products, i.e., the
so-called “pioneer” drugs, successfully to market. Companies
must continually seek new and improved ways to expedite the
research, development and regulatory approval phases of drug
development, all the while without compromising the integrity of
the process itself.5 The extent and vitality of this innovation is a
drug company’s most valued resource.
Evaluating and
ameliorating the way drug research is conducted and funding that
research by product sales or licensing are essential to maintaining a
competitive advantage in the globalized pharmaceutical industry.6
Intellectual property (“IP”) rights inherently affect the nature of
global competition. Industries that do not enjoy the protection of
IP rights, or where such protection is limited in scope or in term by
a country’s legal landscape or by rapid development of new
products, find themselves involved in intense competition that
lowers their profits and stifles future investment. By contrast, in
industries or countries where IP rights protect product sales for
extended periods of time, there is limited competition, prices are
less economically sensitive and profits are higher.
Most
importantly, companies are willing to invest significant amounts of
their revenues in research on future products. If a company or
4

According to a United Nations agency, in the early 1990’s there were 37,000
international companies with 175,000 foreign subsidiaries. By 2003, there were 64,000
international companies with 870,000 subsidiaries. A Taxing Battle, THE ECONOMIST,
Jan. 29, 2004, available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_
id=2388628.
5
See generally Jacques-Pierre Moreau, Pharma Companies Must Shift Focus to
R&D Efforts, BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, Mar. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2005/03/14/focus2.html.
6
In other countries, strategies such as rigid price controls and regulations have
virtually killed such innovation. See, e.g., Joseph H. Golec & John A. Vernon, What’s at
Stake in Pharmaceutical Reimportation: The Costs in Terms of Life Years, Lives, and
Dollars, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 135–137 (2005).
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industry as a whole is unable to (a) adequately protect and exploit
its own IP and (b) gain appropriate access to essential IP owned by
other companies or industries, then its overall functioning will be
significantly impeded in the global economy.
A strong patent system is a supremely important mechanism
for encouraging and fostering pharmaceutical and biomedical
research, drug development, drug products, investments and
ultimately jobs. The owners of patents can exclude others from
making, using or selling the patented inventions.7 This allows
them to gain economic benefit from their inventions and to fund
future improvements. Successful pharmaceutical firms and the
drug research industry at large have strategically harnessed the
burgeoning nature of scientific discovery by patenting their IP to
form intangible assets. These intangible assets are valuable
corporate assets that can make up a great portion of the total worth
of a company.8
Thomas Friedman, the Foreign Affairs columnist for The New
York Times, was among the first to recognize that the value of
these intangible assets would only increase following a
globalization of the industry.9 He also recognized that capital,
which is drawn to markets rapidly by opportunities, or even
perceived opportunities, will abandon those same markets just as
quickly.10 It follows, therefore, that companies in the drug arena
should patent their useful inventions borne of drug research, as
early and as often as possible so as to maintain a competitive
7

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001).
In successful organizations, IP holdings and other intangible assets constitute two to
three times the value of physical assets. During 2000, the market-to-book ratios of
Fortune 500 companies increased to 6.3 to 1, indicating that for every dollar of physical
assets on the balance sheet, the market recognized $6.30 worth of other intangible assets.
Lesley Craig & Lindsay Moore, Intangible Assets, Intellectual Capital Or Property? It
Does Make A Difference, FRONT RANGE TECH BIZ, Feb. 3, 2002, available at
http://www.klminc.com/articles/frt_feb02.html.
9
See generally Thomas L. Friedman, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (First Anchor Books) (2000) (defining intangible assets
as the knowledge-based competence of a company and arguing throughout that
“intangible asset companies” will succeed over “tangible asset companies” in generating
profits in a globalized economy) (1999).
10
See generally id., at ch. 1.
8
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advantage (or even the perception of a competitive advantage) in
the globalized pharmaceutical industry. In this sense, patent
protection has become inseparable from contemporary globalized
capitalism in the area of pharmaceuticals and their discovery and
development.
In order to have value, however, patents must provide effective
economic benefit. Today, for U.S. drug companies that benefit is
impacted by the U.S. patent system and to an increasing degree by
the patent systems of countries around the world. Companies must
manage and leverage their patent portfolios to garner financial
benefits and competitive advantages in the global marketplace. A
strong portfolio can, for example, support future revenue streams,
erect barriers to competition, and enhance a company’s perceived
value to outside investors, partners and acquirers.11 The degree to
which companies can strategically capitalize upon the value of
their own patented technology depends in part on the patent
landscape, country by country, and the degree to which they can
obtain access to patents held by others. Any comprehensive
business strategy should be informed by competitive IP
intelligence.12 Because the parameters of IP rights are conceptual
in nature, however, the extent to which a company can exclude
others from infringing upon its intellectual space (i.e., using these
intangible assets without permission) is much more uncertain than
in the case of trespassing upon real property.
This paper will argue that U.S. patent jurisprudence should
embrace rather than fight the phenomenon of globalization, i.e., the
integration of capital, technology, and information across national
borders, in a way that creates a single global market.13 Patent
infringement jurisprudence in the United States should not promote
the outsourcing of a pharmaceutical firm’s most valuable business
assets or jobs. The U.S. patent system should allow U.S.-based

11
Bill Barrett & Dave Crawford, Integrating the Intellectual Property Value Chain, 20
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY BE43–BE46 (2002).
12
Id.
13
See Thomas L. Friedman, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION
(2000),
available
at
http://www.thomaslfriedman.com/
lexusolivetree.htm (defining globalization).
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pharmaceutical companies a wide enough berth to leverage their
intangible assets within a global framework while also allowing
scientific innovation to continue both at home and abroad.14
Part II will provide an overview of the U.S. patent system and
the scope of patent protection for the pharmaceutical industry in
the United States. It will outline the tension between the patent
laws and free market forces and will review the scope of patent
infringement under United States law. It will provide an overview
of the legal basis of patent infringement for drug research under
both the common law and the Patent Laws of the United States.15 It
will then introduce the legal conflict with regard to the debate over
the breadth of patent protection and infringement across the
pharmaceutical and research tool industries.
Part III of this paper will address U.S. court decisions in the
context of early stage pharmaceutical drug research and patent
infringement. It will examine the conflict that has arisen based on
a limited reading of the common law research exemption and the
resulting development of the more broadly-read “safe harbor”
research exemption to patent infringement in the context of drug
development. It will address the laws that regulate patent
infringement through importation and will consider the most recent
positions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (“Federal Circuit”) in cases that
reflect the current state of early stage drug research and patent
infringement in the United States.
Part IV of this paper will explore the legal climate for
outsourcing early stage drug research to other jurisdictions.
Specifically, it will consider the most recent positions that nonU.S. courts have taken with regard to the proper judicial treatment
14

While not the main topic of this paper, some accommodation must also be given to
the developers of research tools. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. These tools
make important contributions to drug research. Any set of patent infringement decisions
that devalues them will reduce the likelihood that the research tool industry will grow.
This will disadvantage drug development in the long term. Individual countries cannot
affect the value of these tools in the global marketplace. The solution can only be a
global one. See discussion infra Part V.
15
Bryson Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
[hereinafter The Patent Act].
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of research exemptions to patent infringement in the context of
drug development. It will review the laws of Canada, the
European Community and India, in the context of the research
exemption for drug development. It will also examine how
countries outside the U.S. are addressing the problem as a way of
considering whether or not their decisions are encouraging the
outsourcing of U.S. early stage drug research.
Part V will draw together the effects of these diverse
jurisprudences on the patent infringement consequences of early
stage drug research and the outsourcing debate in the United
States. It will argue that current U.S. jurisprudence is forcing U.S.
drug companies to outsource their early stage drug research. It will
also present International Trade Commission (ITC) considerations,
such as the possibility of it exercising unfair competition
jurisdiction if outsourcing involves patented U.S. technology. The
paper concludes by discussing possible solutions for the quagmire
that recent U.S. decisions have created in outsourcing jobs and
technology in early stage drug research.
In sum, a balanced solution is needed. In order to deincentivize drug companies from outsourcing their early stage
research from the United States, the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) safe
harbor research exception may well need to be expanded, by the
Courts or the legislature, to include such early stage drug
discovery. However, at the same time, the research tool industry
will need to be compensated for this shift, possibly through
corporate goodwill programs or by revitalizing the unfair
competition law. The benefits and drawbacks of these possible
solutions will be discussed.
II. PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
An unresolved tension exists between the two purposes of the
U.S. patent system: to disseminate information to the public on one
hand and to reward innovation on the other. The benefit of public
disclosure is clear in that it allows other innovators to build upon
and to advance technological development.
The value of
rewarding patent holders with limited exclusive rights to protect
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their discoveries is also clear in that it allows the proprietor to
recoup his or her costs for inventing while also creating future
incentives to invest resources to develop and commercialize new
technology. However, a delicate balance exists between these
costs and benefits. Companies must engage in value chain
analyses in order to properly manage the huge investments that
must be made in order to galvanize new discoveries, develop
meaningful technology and remain competitive in the world
economy.16 As stated by Abraham Lincoln, himself a patentee:
“The patent system added the fuel of interest to the fire of
genius.”17
Under this public-private (i.e., disclosure-for-protection)
bargain between the inventor and the government, a patent confers
a limited, yet potentially very lucrative, monopoly. A patent
owner’s right to exclude is guaranteed by the property right that
inheres in a patent. A violation of the patent’s exclusivity rights
constitutes patent infringement. Patent infringement in the United
States is the unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to sell or
importing of a patented invention, during the term of the patent.18
During this period of exclusivity, a patent owner can therefore
legally prohibit another from using the patented technologies (i.e.,
enjoin the infringing activity) or can demand payment for such
infringing use through royalties or other consideration.19
Additionally, a patent owner in today’s globalized economy can
16

The IP value chain starts with the inventor’s original idea and has value added by a
series of steps that ultimately yields a legally protected asset. Barrett, supra note 11.
17
Quoted in HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (BNA Books 2003)
(1988).
18
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001).
19
The financial consideration for such use can come in almost any form as agreed by
the parties and can provide a third party with either exclusive or non-exclusive rights to
use a patent. Typical financial considerations include periodic fees upon sale of a
product or process (royalties), up-front fees (typically due at execution of a license
agreement), flat fees or milestone payments (due at certain agreed upon benchmarks
during pre-commercialization), reimbursements (e.g., of patent costs), and sometimes
equity or other compensation in any technology developed through the use of the patent.
See, e.g., JOHNS HOPKINS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE,
(2003) available at http://www.ltd.jhu.edu/about/ipbooklet.html. But cf. eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (holding that a patentee who prevails in
an infringement case is not automatically entitled to a permanent injunction).
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also benefit from the ability to assign the patent property or even
the royalty payments for the rights to use a patent from one
member of a corporate family to another (e.g., subsidiary to parent
within a multinational company) by means of transfer pricing.20
The language of section 271(a) makes clear that any one of the
enumerated activities (making, using, selling, offering to sell or
importing) is actionable as patent infringement. The patentee does
not even need to have any evidence of damage or lost profits to
bring an infringement action.21 The statute does not make clear,
however, whether the accused activities must be commercial. This
leads to one question underlying this paper: Should actionable
infringement activities be limited to commercial activities or
should the patent holder also be allowed to bar others from using
the patented technology for research purposes?
In the pharmaceutical industry there are two general categories
of patents. Both are critical to the development of new drugs. The
first category of patents is directed to the research and
development of the new drug. These patents seek to capitalize
upon the so-called “research tools” used in the drug industry.22
Research tool patents typically include drug targets, cell lines,
transgenic animals, drug screening assays, intermediates, databases
and large libraries of potential drugs. These patents are not
typically infringed by the marketing of the ultimate drug product.23
They are only used in research towards finding and developing the
drug product. In practice, these patents are usually held by smaller
20
Transfer pricing refers to internal corporate pricing schemes used for goods and
services that are traded internally between the divisions of a single multilateral
corporation. This is a highly regulated practice because the choice of transfer prices
affects the division of the total profits and thus the taxable income among related
corporate entities. The U.S. tax law’s application of an arm’s length standard to
transactions involving the exploitation of intangible assets only serves to further
incentivize companies to outsource a company’s value added activities. See Gustafson et
al., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 625, 660 (West Group Publishing
2001).
21
Roche Prod. v. Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
22
A research tool is any item or method useful in conducting experiments in a research
setting. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining “research tool”
as “a term often given to inventions used to conduct research”).
23
But see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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biotechnology companies and research institutions that actively
seek to out license the technology to finance the development of
other research tools or to finance their expansion and ability to
bring a branded pharmaceutical to market.
By contrast, the second general category of patents held in the
pharmaceutical industry is directed to the marketed drug product or
methods of using it. These patents typically cover brand name
pioneer drugs and their uses, e.g., for specific indications. Pioneer
drug patents include:
(1) product patents that cover the active ingredient or
compound in a drug; (2) process patents that cover a
process for manufacturing a drug; (3) method-of-use
patents that relate to a particular method of using a drug;
and (4) formulation patents that cover both the active and
inactive ingredients in a drug (e.g. a final dosage form
tablet or capsule).24
These types of patents are infringed by the sale and use of the
ultimate drug product itself. In practice, these patents are usually
owned by large pharmaceutical firms that have the resources to
bring the drugs to market and to distribute them to consumers
globally.
An ongoing debate within the drug development industry exists
concerning the extent to which companies should be allowed to
operate within the scope of someone else’s research tool patents in
order to develop new drugs. This debate has two facets. On the
one hand, the developers of the research tools and owners of the
patents on those tools want those using the tools to pay royalties
for their use. Research tool companies would prefer that these
royalties “reach through” to the sales of the drug product
discovered through use of the tool.25 This segment of the industry
24

Daniela Bassan, In Cipro We Trust: But How Do We Feel About Our Drug Patent
Laws?, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW: AN ELECTRONIC BOOK OF STUDENT PAPERS (Peter
Barton Hutt ed. 2002), available at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/496/
Bassan.html.
25
The goal of “reach through” claims is to have the patent apply to the ultimate product
that is sold so as to collect royalties from that sale or to preserve for the patent owner the
sole right to develop the product. However, courts have cast doubt on the patentability
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argues that research tool patents need to be protected by the patent
laws and the courts because infringement of research tool patents is
common and there is little a patentee can do to benefit from their
patents, once the research has been completed.26 Research tool
companies argue that without the ability to garner such economic
benefit from their inventions, drug research will suffer and new
tools will not be developed.
On the other hand, drug developers argue that having to obtain
permission to use the many possible research tools potentially
relevant to the development of a particular drug before
development starts and to burden ultimate product sales with
royalties for their use is economically unfeasible. Productivity is
the key challenge in the highly competitive drug development
industry and success is measured by time-to-market.27 This
segment of the industry argues that immediate access to useful
research information is a crucial component of any drug
development platform.28 Pharmaceutical drug developers argue
that research tool patents impose significant transaction costs that

and enforcement of claims to products identified only by reference to the material or
means used to find or identify them. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc denied, 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015 (2004) (holding a patent directed to methods of selectively
inhibiting certain enzyme activity did not sufficiently describe a compound [Celebrex®]
that functioned by that mechanism); Housey Pharms., Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd., 366
F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming judgment of patent invalidity based on lower
court’s broad construction of “inhibitor or activator” of a protein to include an indirect
pathway-binding mechanism); Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no patent infringement where the physical goods were
manufactured from information generated by the patented process). But see Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civil Action No. 02-11280-RWZ (D. Mass. 2006); see
also infra note 142 and accompanying text.
26
See John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021
(2003).
27
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. The “time-to-market” describes the
general length of time that it takes to get a drug product from concept to the marketplace.
A reduced time-to-market is a significant competitive advantage in the pharmaceutical
industry because a pioneer drug can confer significant market power. Id. But cf. Ill. Tool
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006) (holding that patents alone
do not confer a presumption of market power).
28
See generally Walsh et al., supra note 26.
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will delay and possibly prevent future drug development.29 This is
because of the need to either negotiate many license agreements in
advance of beginning the research, or else to proceed at the risk of
substantial damages when the product is launched.30
Recent U.S. court decisions, on the scope of the common law
research exemption as well as the so-called “safe harbor” research
exemption to patent infringement, have tried to split the baby.31
They support research tool patents in early stage drug research and
they support the drug developers in the later drug development and
approval stages.32 This compromise is out of step with the laws
and jurisprudence of other countries.33
It, therefore, has
disadvantaged U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms in their attempts to
develop drugs for the global market in the United States. The U.S.
decisions, for example, have placed significant limitations on
domestic research operations by holding that certain types of
patents related to upstream, early stage discoveries, such as
methods of screening, mechanism of action and targets for drug
intervention, may be infringed in early stage drug research.34
That jurisprudence, when coupled with another series of U.S.
decisions permitting the importation and use of information and
products developed in early stage research conducted outside the
U.S., may have the perhaps unintended and unanticipated effect of
forcing U.S.-based firms to outsource their early stage drug
research.35
Outsourcing, in this context, means that
pharmaceutical firms would move early stage drug discovery
research and its associated technologies and jobs outside the
United States and have either foreign subsidiaries or third parties in
another country (or countries) perform the research and then
reintegrate the results of that research back into the U.S. operations
of the U.S.-based company. Jurisprudence that encourages such
outsourcing is a legitimate cause of concern for those involved in
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
See discussion infra Parts III.A., III.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See infra notes 114–119 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
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the pharmaceutical and regulatory industries in the United States
and to the U.S. economy at large. The next part will review the
evolution of the common law research exemption and the “safe
harbor” research exemption to patent infringement in the context
of the pharmaceutical industry.
III. EXEMPTIONS FROM PATENT INFRINGEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
The use of a patented invention in research falls into a slightly
different camp from that of patent infringement for commercial
activities, as it involves the use of an invention solely for
experimental purposes, such as testing whether a compound
functions as claimed, re-creating a process to observe its effects
from a scientific perspective, and using a patented research tool in
drug discovery.36 Some of these activities, indeed, are the raison
d’être of the patent system—to encourage early publication so that
others can improve upon the invention.37 Other activities are not
really about improving the patented invention but about using it in
research for its intended use to develop other inventions. This
distinction is reflected in the research exemption to patent
infringement in many countries. For example, Canada, the
European Community, and India have carved out varying degrees
of exemptions from infringement for “experimental use” on patents
by third parties.38 The situation in the United States is somewhat
more complicated, as there exists a common law as well as a
statutory research exemption to patent infringement, both with
shifting standards of interpretation and somewhat tortured
jurisprudential histories.39

36

Tom Saunders, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of
the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 261 (2003).
37
See id. at 262.
38
See discussion infra Parts IV.A., IV.B., IV.C.
39
See discussion infra Parts III.A., III.B.
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A. The Common Law Exemption from Patent Infringement
United States jurisprudence has interpreted the common law
exemption, or the experimental use defense, to liability for
infringement rather narrowly. The common law exemption
originated in the early days of patent law as an exemption for
“philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects”.40
Following these holdings, courts have consistently carved out a
narrow exemption to patent infringement for experimental
activities that have no commercial purpose. The sliver of this
carving was established in Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray
Fishing, Inc.41 where the Court found infringement for the
experimental use of a freezing apparatus on a commercial fishing
boat. Even though the Court acknowledged that the operators of
the boat were using the freezing method experimentally,
infringement was deemed to have occurred because it took place
without a license on board a boat that was engaged in commercial
fishing operations.42 An experimental use coupled with a
commercial use, therefore, even if de minimis, constitutes patent
infringement.43
Despite this ruling, patent infringement defendants continue to
seek protection of the experimental use and the de minimis use
exemptions concomitantly. Courts, indeed, have clarified the de
minimis defense with regard to patent infringement by holding it
akin to the experimental use defense. The Court of Claims in
Douglas v. United States, for example, stated that the experimental
use defense is just “an expression of the maxim de minimis non
curat lex.” 44 This construction has served to limit even further the
common law or experimental use exemption in the United States.
40

Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); see
also Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279)
(exempting experiments with a patented article which are “for the sole purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste, or for curiosity, or for mere amusement”).
41
322 F.2d 34, 37 (9th Cir. 1963).
42
Id.
43
See id. at 36.
44
181 U.S.P.Q. 170, 177 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974), aff’d, 206 Ct. Cl. 96 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(“The law does not concern itself with trifles.”).
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In fact, courts often question whether any infringing use of a patent
can be de minimis. The Federal Circuit’s Judge Rader, for
example, opined that since the Patent Act confers the right to
preclude “use” and not “substantial use,” it affirmatively precludes
de minimis excuses.45 Only somewhat more leniently, the court in
Deuterium Corp. v. United States, held that “[d]amages for an
extremely small infringing use may be de minimis, but
infringement is not a question of degree.”46 This latter rationale
has been used to support the view that the common law research
exemption should not itself be considered a true exemption from
infringement but rather a means to provide limited damages for de
minimis infringement.47
Subsequent cases have supported this strict view of
infringement and the limited defenses thereto. No activity that
furthers a commercial purpose of any sort qualifies for the
protection under the common law research exemption in the
United States.
For example, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service
Engineering Corp.,48 plaintiff Embrex was the exclusive licensee
of a patented method for immunizing birds against disease in ovo
(in egg) and was practicing this patent commercially in large scale
industrial chicken farms. Defendant Service Engineering Corp.
(“SEC”) used the patented method in an attempt to design around
it and to build its own inoculating machine.49 Embrex sued and
SEC contended it was performing scientific experiments that did
not result in any sale, and therefore its actions were either de
minimis, or exempt under the experimental use exception.50 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s refusal to set aside the

45

Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J.,
concurring).
46
19 Cl. Ct. 624, 631 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
47
See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
as corrected, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated and
remanded by Merck KgaA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
48
216 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1349.
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jury’s verdict of infringement.51 In its ruling, the Federal Circuit
reiterated that even the slightest commercial implication will
render the experimental use exemption (and the de minimis use
exemption, for that matter) inapplicable.52
Despite its avowed narrowness, the experimental use
exemption was for a time presumed by some to exist at academic
research universities and other not-for-profit organizations.
However, the law has made clear that this is not the case. A trial
court denied the existence of a university qua university research
exemption in Infigen Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology Inc.53
There, the experimental use exemption was denied for work done
in university research laboratories using patented technology as
controls, on the basis that “it is up to Congress to decide whether
there should be an infringement exemption for university-based
research laboratories. So far, Congress has not seen fit to grant
one.”54
In Madey v. Duke University, a landmark decision that once
and for all ended the experimental use exemption in the context of
the non-profit entity carrying out allegedly infringing commercial
activities, the Federal Circuit reached a similar conclusion.55 In
this case, Dr. John Madey, a scientist and former professor at Duke
University, claimed that Duke had engaged in the unauthorized use
of his patent protected lab equipment and sued Duke for
infringement.56 The District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Duke, holding that Duke’s use of the equipment was for
experimental, non-commercial purposes.57 However, on appeal,
the Federal Circuit enunciated once again a narrow reading of the
51

“While SEC tries to cloak these tests in the guise of scientific inquiry, that alone
cannot immunize its acts . . . Just because SEC was unsuccessful in selling its machines
does not confer infringement immunity upon SEC for its infringing acts.” Id.
52
Id. at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring).
53
65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
54
Id. at 981 (citing, e.g., the Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act
of 1990, H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990), “which was never passed but which, [inter alia,]
proposed exemptions from infringement liability for university research”).
55
307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
56
Duke had used a laser gun, developed and patented by Dr. Madey, for its intended
purpose as a research tool, not to use or study the gun itself. Id. at 1353.
57
Id. at 1355–56.
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common law research exemption and held that because a research
university’s goals were inherently commercial in nature, its nonprofit status was irrelevant; Duke was, therefore, not exempt from
infringement qua university.58 This decision has further cabined
the common law research exemption even in the context of
scientific research performed at academic institutions.
The Federal Circuit’s Judge Pauline Newman has taken issue
with this fettering of the experimental use doctrine. She restated
her dissatisfaction with the Madey decision and the narrow
research exemption it embraced in a forceful and compelling
dissent in Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA.59 There, she
argued that a narrowing of the common law exemption is “illsuited to today’s research-founded, technology-based economy.”60
In her view, the patent system is designed to promote the progress
of science.61 That goal cannot be achieved if all uses of a patented
invention are forbidden until the patent expires. A common law
research exemption must exist, therefore, to facilitate further
knowledge and understanding of what the patentee has done in
order to understand the patented invention, to improve upon it, to
find a new use for it, or to modify or design around it.62 If such
research were subject to infringement prohibition, the patentee
would effectively be granted a de facto monopoly enabling him or
her to bar not only patent-protected competition, but also all
research-based efforts to improve, evaluate, compare, challenge or
avoid the patented technology.63 Such jurisprudence, in Judge
Newman’s view, would stifle technological advancement and run

58

Id. at 1362–63 (explaining that research activities are infringing if they further the
institution’s business objectives of educating and enlightening students, increasing the
status of the institution and luring lucrative research grants, students and faculty).
59
331 F.3d 860, 872–78 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). In Integra LifeSciences I, Merck was using patented products to develop the “best”
drug for the treatment of cancer. Id. at 861.
60
Id. as corrected, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, at *35 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
61
Id. at *46. Her philosophy is derived from the United States Constitution, which
expressly grants Congress the legislative power “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
62
Integra Lifesciences, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 at *42.
63
See id. at *45.
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counter to the framework of patent law, which both contemplates
and facilitates research into patented subject matter.64
Ultimately, Judge Newman recognized that a narrow tight rope
must be walked in order to preserve the patentee’s incentive to
innovate (which is secured by the patent’s right to exclude) while
also fostering the creation of new knowledge using the patent as
the stepping off point. To balance these two societal needs, Judge
Newman reasoned that the boundary of the common law research
exemption must lie somewhere in between the generally
distinguishable phases of “research” and “development.”65
The development phase of drug discovery, referred to by Judge
Newman, had previously been addressed in Roche Products v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.66 This seminal case involved the
limitations of the common law research exemption in the context
of generic drugs.67 This case involved a suit between a large
research-oriented pharmaceutical company (Roche) and a
manufacturer of generic drugs (Bolar).68 Roche sought to enjoin
Bolar from using its domestically patented drug, which Bolar had
obtained from a foreign manufacturer, to conduct the federally
mandated tests necessary to market, after expiration of the patent, a

64

Id. at *43–45.
Id. at *45. Judge Rader’s majority opinion hastily dismissed this dissent by noting
that this exemption was not before the court in this case and, even if it were, the Patent
Act does not include the word “experimental,” let alone an experimental use exemption
from infringement. Id. at *43 n.2.
66
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
67
A general distinction in the drug industry exists between research-based
pharmaceutical firms that invest heavily in the research and development of original
products (i.e. brand-name pioneer drugs), and generic drug companies that do typically
not engage in novel research but instead copy the active ingredient in already approved
pioneer drugs to bring a competing non-brand-name product to market. These generic
products, also called “copycat” or “me-too” drugs, are the bioequivalent of the branded
products and can be marketed at lower prices because their manufacturers do not incur
the costs associated with the creation and marketing of pioneer drugs. Moreover, generic
drug companies can target only the most successful products on the market. This again
reduces their costs because they do not spend monies or effort on less successful
products. See generally United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 454–60
(1983).
68
Roche Products, 733 F.2d 858.
65
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generic drug equivalent to Roche’s brand name drug.69 The
District Court held that Bolar’s “experimental” testing was not
infringement because the use was de minimis and experimental.70
The Federal Circuit reversed, however, stating that the
experimental use exemption is truly narrow and cannot be
expanded to encompass tests, demonstrations or experiments that
further legitimate business interests and thus clearly serve
commercial purposes.71
Bolar argued that this decision violated public policy because it
de facto extended the patent term beyond the stated limit.72 The
Patent Act, in force in 1984, granted to inventors a 17-year
property right to their inventions.73 The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”),74 on the other hand, required several
statutory and regulatory steps to assure the safety and efficacy of
generic drugs to be marketed.75 Because it could take 1–2 years
for a generic company to satisfy these regulatory requirements for
marketing a generic drug, Bolar argued that the arrival of generic
drugs on the market would be unduly delayed, and the patent term
unfairly extended, if the FDCA required tests on the patented
product could not begin until after expiration of the patent term.76
69

Id.
Id. at 860–61.
71
Id. at 863. “We cannot construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a
violation of the patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has
definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.” Id.
72
Id. at 864.
73
The law has since changed. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103465, § 532 (a)(1) (1994). The term of a patent used to be 17 years from the issue date of
the patent. Now, for applications that were pending, and patents that were still in force,
on June 8, 1995, the patent term is either 17 years from the issue date or 20 years from
the earliest claimed filing date, whichever is longer. For applications filed on or after
June 8, 1995, the patent term is 20 years from the application’s earliest claimed filing
date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1996).
74
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (1938).
75
Id.
76
Roche Products, 733 F.2d at 864 (citing THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING,
THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, 79–80 (1983)).
While the requirements of the FDCA had the effect of extending the term of a patent in
the context of generic competition, they also had the effect of reducing the total term of
patent protection in the context of the branded drug. This is because, while patents
typically are granted 3-5 years after filing, the testing required to support approval by the
70
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The Federal Circuit declined to create a new exemption to
infringement for the testing of generic drugs. The Roche Products
court found no support for such exemption in the Patent Act and
refused to “engage in legislative activity proper only for the
Congress.”77
B. The Statutory Exemption from Patent Infringement
Congress responded promptly to the Roche Products decision
and to the lobbying efforts of the branded and generic
pharmaceutical industries, by enacting a statutory compromise.78
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (also known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”)79 amended the
FDCA and the Patent Act to rectify the distortions enunciated in
the Roche Products case by (a) establishing an abbreviated
approval process for generic drugs; (b) restoring the patent term for
pioneer drugs so as to recover patent term lost during the lengthy
approval process; and (c) creating a “safe harbor” exemption—or
the Bolar exemption as it is referred to outside the U.S.—from
patent infringement for work that was needed to obtain drug
approval.80 The legislative intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act was
to strike a balance between the interests of pharmaceutical
companies, generic manufacturers and consumers, by encouraging
greater expenditure in the area of pharmaceutical invention through
longer effective patent terms while simultaneously encouraging
generic drug development and ensuring greater competition
immediately after the expiration or invalidity of the relevant
patents.81
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a branded drug often takes 10–12 years.
Thus, by the time the drug product reaches the market, only 8–10 years of patent
protection remain. See id.
77
Roche Products, 733 F.2d at 863–64.
78
This statute did not, however, disturb the Federal Circuit’s enunciation in Roche
Products of the parameters of the common law experimental use exception.
79
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
80
Id.
81
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 16–18 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2649–51. See also Samuel M. Kais, A Survey of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as
Interpreted by the Courts: The Infringement Exemption Created by the 1984 Patent Term
Restoration Act, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 575, 576 (1997) (citing
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To address the first goal, Congress created several new
provisions to encourage greater investment in pharmaceutical
innovation. Specifically, the Hatch-Waxman Act restored at least
a part of the patent term for pioneer drugs that had undergone
protracted pre-market testing to ensure drug safety and efficacy as
mandated by the FDCA, after the patent had issued.82 Under these
provisions, branded drugs have been entitled to an average
extension of about three years in patent term.83 This extension
allows the patent owner more time to recoup the expenses of drug
development and to fund subsequent research on new drugs by
marketing the drugs at “patent” prices.84
The second goal was to ensure greater competition in the
market, i.e., to maximize the post-patent availability of lower
priced products, by narrowing the gap between patent expiration
and generic entry.85 To do this, Congress established a “safe
harbor” exemption for otherwise infringing activities if they relate
to the development and submission of information to the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”).86 Specifically, the statute recites
that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the
United States a patented invention. . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984)).
82
See Kais, supra note 81, at 577.
83
Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has
Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, at 4, 28 (1998) available at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=5 (click “PDF”).
84
The extension compensates the patent owner for a part of the time the patent was not
protecting the owner from the market because the drug was not yet approved. It does so
by moving a part of the ineffective patent term to the effective patent term, i.e., when the
drug is on the market. A maximum of five years can be restored to the patent term. The
total patent term, with an extension, cannot exceed fourteen years from the product’s
approval date. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1994).
85
See Kais, supra note 81.
86
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological
products.87
This provision allows competitors to engage in otherwise
infringing activities that are reasonably related to obtaining
regulatory approval.88 Research on a patented drug can thus be
conducted, before expiration of the patent term and without
incurring liability for patent infringement, in order to accelerate the
process of getting a drug to market.89 To be sure, Congress passed
section 271(e)(1) with the intent of facilitating the entry of generic
drugs into the market upon expiration of the brand name patent on
the compound with as little barrier to entry, i.e., artificial extension
of the patent monopoly, as possible.90 Because of the HatchWaxman Act generic drugs can now enter the U.S. market almost
immediately after patent protection on the brand name drug
expires, or is held to be invalid or unenforceable, in contrast to the
case in many other countries.91 In many ways the Hatch-Waxman
Act created the generic drug industry.92
87

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). The full recitation excludes
new animal drugs and veterinary products from the patented inventions, presumably
because the rest of the complex patent term restoration law excluded these drugs.
88
See Kais, supra note 81.
89
Other provisions were also added in the Hatch-Waxman Act to accelerate the
approval process for generic drugs specifically. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). Again,
however, the Hatch-Waxman Act balanced the right of the generic and the drug
companies. For example, it made the filing of an application for approval of a generic
drug (an “ANDA”) an act of infringement that allowed patentees to sue even though such
filing was not a making, using or selling of the patented drug. It also provided that the
FDA could not approve the generic for the lesser of 30 months after the ANDA filing,
patent expiration, or a court holding of patent invalidity (the “30 month stay”). This gave
the branded companies the chance to enforce the patent against the generic to prevent
marketing before valid patent expiration and yet allowed the generic to file for approval
to market before the patent term expired. This protects customers from having to pay
“patent” prices for drugs that are the subject of expired or invalid patents.
90
See generally Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286
and H.R. 3605 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
of Justice,of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 527 (1984).
91
See infra Part IV.
92
Before Hatch-Waxman, only 35% of the top-selling drugs had generic competition
after their patents expired; now almost all pioneer (non-biological) drugs face such
competition. See Henry Grabowski and John Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower
Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 195–98 (May 1986). See
also A. Maureen Rouhi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, Legislative Action Seeks to Close
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However, the language of the “safe harbor” of section
271(e)(1) is not limited to generic drug manufacturers or to drug
patents.93 This breadth of statutory language has been a hallmark
of the jurisprudence construing the safe harbor. By contrast with
the common law exemption, U.S. courts have construed the safe
harbor exemption rather broadly. The Supreme Court, for
example, has construed the term “patented invention” of 271(e)(1)
to include all patented inventions, including medical devices and
human biologics as well as drug products.94 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has effectively read the provision “solely” out of the
language of the statute.95 Courts have also adopted a flexible
reading of the phrase “reasonably related” so as to give parties
some latitude in making prospective judgments about the nature
and extent of activities they plan to engage in to win FDA
approval.96
In Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., the California District Court
reasoned that accused acts should be protected as long as it would
have been reasonable for a party to believe there was a “decent
prospect” that the activities in question would contribute to the
generation of information relevant to the FDA approval process.97
This became known as the “objective reality” test.98 More
recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New

Loopholes in U.S. Law that Delay Entry of Generics Into the Market, 80 CHEMICAL &
ENG’G NEWS 53–59 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/
8038/8038biogenerics2.html.
93
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990) (holding that a
“Federal law” in 271(e)(1) refers to any regulation under the FDCA, not only those
relating to drugs or veterinary biological products); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16110, at *177–78 (D. Mass. 1989).
94
See id.
95
AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that
271(e)(1) language does not look to the underlying purposes or consequences of the
research activity, thus, as long as the research is reasonably related to obtaining FDA
approval, the data can also be used for other purposes).
96
See, e.g., Intermedics v. Ventritex, Co., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
97
Id.
98
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 111 (D. Mass.
1998). See also Katherine A. Helm & James F. Haley, Jr., The Fine Line of the Law:
Patent Infringement Exemptions in the U.S., LIFE SCIENCES LAW & BUSINESS, Dec.
2004/Jan. 2005.
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York ruled that the use of patented intermediates that were being
used as research tools in drug development but would never be
submitted to the FDA for approval themselves, was exempted from
infringement under the safe harbor.99 In rendering its verdict, the
Court applied the objective reality test and found that there was a
decent prospect that the use of the patented intermediates would
contribute to the generation of information relevant to FDA
approval.100 Based on these broad judicial constructions, therefore,
the safe harbor can be invoked by any organization making or
using any patented invention for purposes that are “reasonably
related” to the development and submission of information for
government (i.e., FDA) approval to market. The safe harbor thus
eviscerates the patentees’ right to exclude in these circumstances.
Determining the precise contours of safe harbor protection
from patent infringement nonetheless remains the source of much
legal debate, because, in the words of the Supreme Court, the
hastily drafted 1984 act is simply “not plainly comprehensible on
anyone’s view.”101 Bereft of clear statutory guidance, courts often
look to the legislative history of the statute in an attempt to uphold
the intent of encouraging greater expenditure and competition in
the area of pharmaceutical innovation.102 While U.S. courts have
consistently held that the safe harbor applies to activities that are
reasonably related to seeking FDA approval, the issue of when the
safe harbor begins remains a stumbling block.103 A strong
undercurrent of legal and political conflict surrounds this question

99
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-8833, 2001 WL
1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001) (overruled on other grounds in 326 F.3d 1226 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
100
Id. at *3–4.
101
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 667 (1990), cited in William L
Warren, Supreme Court Broadens Therapeutic Research Exemption From Patent
Infringement in Merck, IP Value 2006, available at http://www.buildingipvalue.com/
06US_Can/131_134.htm.
102
See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383–84 (2005).
103
Unlike the circumscribed clinical test periods required by the FDA (i.e., Phase I tests
for safety, Phase II tests for efficacy and Phase III tests for side effects and long-term use
effects), the earlier research and preclinical testing phases embraced by the safe harbor
are far less delineated.
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because its answer will effectively determine the worth of patents
directed to upstream drug discovery technology, such as patents for
methods of screening, mechanism of action and targets for drug
intervention as well as patents on research tools.
Where the line is drawn with respect to whether or not early
stage drug research is exempt from patent infringement is,
therefore, sharply divided between drug developers on the one
hand and research tool patent proprietors on the other. If early
stage drug research is exempt, the research tool company loses the
value of the patent. If early stage drug research is not exempt, the
drug developer must either negotiate a number of licenses before
beginning drug development and as a result burden the ultimate
product with costs or restrictions up front or risk the spectra of
injunctions and downstream damages for use of the patented tool.
The controversy is ongoing.
Recent decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
suggest that there may be some early stage drug research that is
outside the safe harbor and not protected by the common law
research exemption to patent infringement. The Supreme Court
directly addressed the 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption in Merck
KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd.104 This highly prominent case
involved experiments that were conducted by the Scripps Research
Institute and funded by Merck on compounds known as “RGD”
peptides.105 The experiments sought to determine the peptides’
efficacy as inhibitors of angiogenesis (to reduce blood flow to
tumors) and suitability as potential anti-cancer drug candidates for
clinical trials.106 Integra brought suit against Merck for conducting
drug screening, lead optimization, and preclinical tests (i.e. nonhuman) on drug candidates using certain Integra-patented cell
adhesion-promoting RGD peptides.107 The issue that rose to the
Supreme Court was whether uses of patented inventions in

104

125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
RGD peptides were those that contained the tripeptide sequence Arg-Gly-Asp. Id. at
2377.
106
Id. at 2377–78.
107
The Integra-patented RGD peptides were used as “positive controls” against which
Scripps measured the efficacy of the lead drug candidates. Id. at 2379.
105
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preclinical research, the results of which were not directly included
in a submission to the FDA but rather were used to identify and
characterize the best drug candidate for future clinical testing, were
within the safe harbor and thus exempt from infringement
liability.108
The District Court ruled and the Federal Circuit affirmed that
the safe harbor was confined to activity that would “contribute
relatively directly” to information the FDA would consider in
approving a drug and therefore, Merck had infringed Integra’s
patents in its preclinical activities.109 The Federal Circuit refused
to make room under the umbrella of section 271(e)(1) for
“exploratory research” testing that “at some point, however
attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process.”110 The
Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit’s strict construction
of the safe harbor and created what it called a “wide berth” for the
use of patented drugs in activities that necessarily include
preclinical studies for the development of a potential drug
candidate.111 This holding is not surprising in view of the strong
push by the United States Government as amicus curia to broadly
interpret the upstream boundary of section 271(e)(1) to favor the
discovery of new cancer treatments, as a matter of public policy.112
Not insignificantly, the pharmaceutical industry also strongly
supported Merck and Scripps, arguing that every activity during
drug development generates valuable information that helps
determine whether a potential new drug treatment will progress

108

Id. at 2376. At the trial level Merck argued both the common law research
exemption defense and the safe harbor defense. But, the former was abandoned on
appeal to the Federal Circuit, in part because in the recent wake of the Madey decision
there was a perception that the common law use defense was dead. See discussion Part
III.A. and notes 59–64 (discussing Judge Newman’s dissent). See also, Harold C.
Wegner, Post-Merck Experimental Use and the “Safe Harbor”, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 13–
17 (2005). Thus, the only question that remained was what constituted the upstream
boundary of the safe harbor exemption.
109
See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
110
Id.
111
Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
112
See generally, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 429972.
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towards gaining FDA approval to market.113 This reasoning
clearly resonated with the Supreme Court, as it stated “[w]e thus
agree with the Government that the use of patented compounds in
preclinical studies is protected under §271(e)(1) as long as there is
a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments will produce
‘the types of information that are relevant to [FDA
submissions].’”114
The Supreme Court tempered its broad holding only slightly by
agreeing with the Federal Circuit that the safe harbor exemption
does not apply to all experimental activity and does not protect
basic scientific research on a particular compound conducted
without any intent to develop a particular drug.115 Thus, the
Supreme Court insinuated that early-stage exploratory research
may be outside the safe harbor.116 Finally, although the Supreme
Court acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s suggestion that a limited
construction of the safe harbor was necessary to avoid depriving
research tool patents of value, the Court pithily declined to address
the implications for research tool patents in its decision.117
There has been much controversy surrounding the Merck
decision, both from the drug industry and the research tool
industry. Many commentators have argued that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the safe harbor is not one of strict
constructionism and that this matter should be left for the
legislature to amend and further delineate the “reasonably related”
text of section 271(e)(1).118 In such legislative construction, large
drug companies would undoubtedly lobby for Congress to
definitively broaden the safe harbor due to the time and cost
involved in innovative drug development and to positively shelter
113

See generally Brief for Eli Lilly and Co., Wyeth & Pfizer, Inc. as Amici Curiae,
Supporting Petitioner, Merck KgaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (No. 03-1237), 2005 WL 435888.
114
Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2383–84 (quoting Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 23). See also Wegner, supra note 108, at 23–27.
115
Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382.
116
See id.
117
Id. at 2382 n.7. The Supreme Court reasoned that because RGD peptides were not
used as research tools, “[w]e therefore need not—and do not—express a view about
whether, or to what extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of ‘research
tools’ in the development of information for the regulatory process.”
118
See Wegner, supra note 108, at 27.
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drug developers from patent infringement liability during these
development activities.
On the other hand, research tool
companies would lobby to restrict the safe harbor so as to provide
value to their patents and business models. In the absence of
further legislation, the safe harbor provision will have to be
revisited by the courts to determine the fate of research tool patents
generally.
The future ramifications of holding certain experimental
activity outside the safe harbor on the research and development
operations of U.S. pharmaceutical firms are manifold. One
potential ramification is that early stage exploratory drug research
will be outsourced to non-U.S. jurisdictions, where it either would
not constitute infringement under local jurisprudence or where no
patents exist or are of limited enforceability. Uncertainty creates
risk and the currently indeterminate state of section 271(e)(1)’s
upstream boundary will motivate U.S.-based pharmaceutical
companies to engage in risk management and move their valueadded activities offshore.119
For large multinational pharmaceutical firms, the outsourcing
of early stage drug research can be accomplished by transferring a
particular research activity from a U.S. enterprise to an associated
non-U.S. enterprise (e.g., a foreign subsidiary). U.S.-based
pharmaceutical firms must carefully select an offshore location for
research to optimize the legal and economic circumstances
surrounding the transaction.120 U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms
who decide to outsource the early drug research to an optimal
location must also consider the next transaction in the global
supply chain: What happens when they bring information obtained
119
While lawyers may view the currently amorphous limit of the safe harbor as an
invitation to test the boundaries, companies would rather alter their research operations to
ensure that their practice falls under a clear set of defined rules. See Wegner, supra note
108.
120
There are significant tax implications involved when transferring these sorts of
intangible corporate assets between affiliated companies in different countries. See, e.g.,
Martin Sullivan, With Billions at Stake, Glaxo puts U.S. APA Program on Trial, 34 TAX
NOTES INT’L 456 (2004) (discussing the largest transfer pricing case in history involving
GlaxoSmithKline’s allocation of income between its U.K. patents and its U.S. marketing
intangibles).
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and/or lead drug compounds identified in research conducted
offshore back into the United States? This next section examines
the legal implications of importing the results or products of early
stage drug research that has been conducted offshore into the U.S.
C. Exemptions from Patent Infringement Through Importation
The Patent Laws of the United States address the importation
of products produced in non-U.S. jurisdictions by processes
patented in the United States. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), the
importation of a product into the U.S. that was made abroad by a
process patented in the United States is infringement.121 This
section thus offers a remedy to patent holders in cases where the
importation of products manufactured abroad would be infringing
if produced within the United States. Indeed, Congress enacted
section 271(g) to provide “meaningful protection” to process
patent holders and to eliminate the potential for circumvention of
U.S. patent law through conduct abroad.122 This protection is
particularly important for research-based pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies that invest substantial capital in the
process of developing and producing a drug product that may
ultimately be protectable by a process patent alone.123 The body of

121

35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988). The statute lists two exceptions to infringement under
this section: when the product is materially changed by subsequent processes or when the
product becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
122
While U.S. law “cannot prevent a party from performing a patented process abroad,
it can and does prevent a party from bringing the resulting products into this country. In
doing so, the law attempts to provide full substantive protection of patentees’ exclusive
rights in the United States.” See Kristin E. Gerdelman, Comment, Subsequent
Performance of Process Steps by Different Entities: Time to Close Another Loophole in
U.S. Patent Law, 53 EMORY L.J. 1987, 2003 (2004).
123
Process patents can be obtained for new processes of making old products. Because
many biotechnological products are inherently found in nature, biotechnological
innovation frequently takes the form of finding more efficient ways to make a preexisting “product.” A process patent is often the only patent protection a biotechnology
company has for a product. Thus, the biotechnology industry was one of the strongest
advocates for the enactment of section 271(g). See Process Patent Legislation: Hearing
on S. 568, S. 573, and S. 635 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 27–28 (1987) (statement of
Richard D. Godown, President, Industrial Biotechnology Association) (“The very
availability of these products (and associated jobs) is threatened when a company cannot
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case law construing these provisions, therefore, needs to be
considered insofar as it would impact the outsourcing of early
stage drug research by pharmaceutical companies.
The first consideration involves the exemption to liability for
infringement, under section 271(g)(1), when the product is
“materially changed” by subsequent processes from the end
product produced by the patented process. Initial cases generally
construed the term in a straightforward manner to uphold the
legislative intent of the statute and to attach liability when a
process being performed abroad was deemed to constitute an
“essential part of the overall process” for producing a product
intended for the U.S. market.124
However, an increasingly sophisticated drug industry soon
begat increasingly complex issues for the courts. In Eli Lilly & Co.
v. American Cyanamid Co.,125 Eli Lilly sued generic drug
manufacturer American Cyanamid for importing an antibiotic drug
(cefaclor) that was made by a process that included Lilly’s
patented process for making an intermediate chemical (compound
6).126 Lilly argued that because the only commercial use for the
intermediate compound in the U.S. was to produce the drug
cefaclor, the intermediate was essentially the same as the drug and
thus could not meet the “materially changed” requirement for
exemption from infringement.127 The district court disagreed and
held that cefaclor’s unique structural and biological properties
be assured that its multi-million dollar research program will not be vulnerable to unfair
practices.”).
124
See, e.g., Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1561 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that a process for making a plasmid as a replicable cloning vehicle
encompasses using it to express its intended protein product—human growth hormone—
which was imported into the U.S. for marketing and sale).
125
82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
126
Cefaclor is a complex molecule derived from forms of penicillin. American
Cyanamid’s Italian manufacturer produced bulk cefaclor in a nine-step process with a
starting material (compound 1), eight chemically distinct intermediates (compounds 2–9),
and a final end product (cefaclor). Eli Lilly had obtained patents on several of the
intermediates as well as the end product. Since most of these patents had expired, Lilly
was only able to rely on the patent on the process of making compound 6 (that covered
the process of converting compound 5 to compound 6) in this suit. Eli Lilly & Co. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 896 F. Supp. 851, 853–54 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
127
Id. at 856–58.
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constituted a material change from intermediate compound 6 as
produced by the patented process.128 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed and held that the structural differences between
the intermediate and the end compound rose to the level of a
material change.129 In its decision, the court acknowledged the
overseas use of patented processes in research was a global
concern, but stated it could not stretch the term “materially
changed” to broaden the statute’s effectiveness in addressing the
problem.130
This ruling broke ground for pharmaceutical
companies to outsource intermediate products and research tools in
early stage drug research.
The second decision that further opened the way for
outsourcing involved a construction of the non-manufacturing
exemption to liability for infringement under section 271(g).131 In
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms. Inc.,132 the process patents in
question were directed to methods of screening protein inhibitors
and activators for compounds that indicated a potential for
development as pharmaceuticals.133 The issue that arose was
whether Bayer was liable for importing data into the United States
that was obtained from practicing these research tool process
patents.134 The court held that section 271(g) does not entitle the
patent holder to exclude the importation into the United States of
information obtained by carrying out the patented method
overseas.135 Under Housey, section 271(g)’s purview was limited
to physically manufactured goods brought into the United
States.136 This ruling suggests information from early stage drug
research done abroad (and likely, lead drug compounds identified
128

Id.
Eli Lilly, 82 F.3d 1568.
130
Id. at 1572.
131
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001), overruled
on other grounds by 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 329.
134
Housey alleged that Bayer should be held liable upon importation of “any knowledge
and information” that reflected the identification or characterization of a drug acquired
from using Housey’s patented methods. Id.
135
Id. at 330.
136
See id.
129
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in the research) may be imported into the U.S. without infringing
process patents under section 271(g).
Finally, those who outsource need to consider whether the drug
products or processes they develop will infringe early stage drug
research patents. For example, the patents at issue in Merck KGaA
v. Integra Lifesciences I Ltd.137 claimed the RGD peptides
themselves.138 Therefore, while the use of those peptides in early
stage drug research outside of the U.S. (under Eli Lilly) and the
importation of information learned in the research brought into the
U.S. (under Housey) might not be infringing activities, the ultimate
sale of the peptides would potentially infringe. 139 By contrast, as
discussed previously in this paper, “reach through” claims to
products developed by patented research tools are likely not
valid.140 Hence, those products could likely be sold in the U.S.
without infringing the research tool patents.141 This untested
analysis is further complicated by a perplexing recent jury decision
which held the sales of two drug products infringed a patent
claiming the mechanism of action of those products.142
137

545 U.S. 193, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
Id. at 2377.
139
See 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001).
140
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
141
See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(holding a patent directed to methods of selectively inhibiting certain enzyme activity did
not sufficiently describe a compound [Celebrex®] that functioned by that mechanism).
For further discussion, see Rakesh Mehta, University of Rochester Corp. v. G.D. Searle
& Co., Inc.: How to Lose Millions in Patent Royalties, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 547 (2005).
142
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., Civil Action No. 02-11280-RWZ, (D.
Mass. May 4, 2006), LexisNexis Jury Verdicts and Settlement Report. In this unusual
verdict, a federal jury held a patent owned by Harvard University, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and the Whitehead Institute, and licensed to Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, was valid and infringed by the sale of Eli Lilly’s osteoporosis drug
Evista® and septic shock drug Xigris®. The patent claims methods for treating human
disease by regulating cell-signaling through the NF-kappa B molecular pathway. The
jury awarded Ariad approximately $65 million in back royalties as well as a 2.3% royalty
rate on U.S. sales of the drugs until expiration of the patent in 2019. Eli Lilly has said
that it will ask the trial judge to overturn the jury verdict and, if necessary, appeal the
jury’s verdict. After an August evidentiary hearing, the trial court is now considering
Lilly’s allegations that the Ariad patent is not enforceable. Also in August, following two
ex parte requests for reexamination of the Ariad patent, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office rejected 160 of the 203 claims as being not patentable. See Reexam.
C.N. 90/007,503. Finally, in a separate proceeding, Amgen Inc. recently sued Ariad for a
138
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Many have argued that Congress must intervene to clean up
this clutter of jurisprudence and refine the Patent Laws, to ensure
that infringers cannot subvert the Patent Laws to violate the rights
of U.S. patentees. Some attempts have already been made to close
the gaps in the law that have facilitated the use of outsourcing.
Representative Jim Gerlach, for example, has proposed a new bill
to amend section 271(g) to broaden the reach of the process patent
infringement statute and define the term “product” to include both
physical goods and information in any fixed format.143 This would
overcome the potential loophole created by the Housey decision.144
It would also level the playing field between the U.S. and other
countries in the context of where research for ultimate use in the
U.S. can be performed. However, it could push U.S. companies to
outsource even more of their drug development efforts. Under
such a law, companies would probably carry out all of the drug
research up to the final compound outside the United States.
Pharmaceutical companies, who choose to outsource their early
stage drug research efforts and bring back elements of that research
to the U.S., will undoubtedly devise a model for their business
operations that minimizes their potential liability under the U.S.
Patent Laws.145 However, as mentioned earlier, multinational
companies must be mindful of the entire legal and economic
circumstances surrounding any transaction that outsource part of
their businesses, in an effort to maximize their global profitability
and minimize their liability at home and abroad.146 The next
section addresses the step in the business supply chain that entails
selecting offshore locations for early stage drug research.

declaratory judgment that two of Amgen’s drugs Enbrel® and Kineret®, both treatments
for rheumatoid arthritis, do not infringe the Ariad patent and that the patent is invalid. See
Amgen Inc. et al. v. Ariad Pharms., Inc., No. 06-259 (D. Del. Apr. 10, 2006). The cases
and reexaminations are unlikely to be resolved for several years.
143
See Informatics Act of 2005, H.R. 4208, 109th Cong. (2005).
144
See 169 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Del. 2001).
145
This model will operationalize the potential legal liability as best it can. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
146
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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IV. PATENT INFRINGEMENT OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES
The principles underlying patent systems outside the United
States are much the same as those in the United States. Both
systems serve to encourage innovation and to promote the progress
of science and technology. The principles of patent infringement
are also much the same in that activities including the making,
using, selling, offering for sale and importing of patented products
or processes are generally held to be infringing. Likewise, the
remedies for such infringement are also fairly standard and include
injunctions for the future and damages (typically royalties) for the
past, to make the patent holder whole.147 International IP
agreements between the United States and most other
industrialized nations serve to promote global judicial comity and
harmonize many basic tenets of patent infringement rulings and
remedies.148
Attempts at global patent harmonization falter, however, in two
main situations. The first is in countries where either the patent
laws themselves are weak or the enforcement of those laws is
virtually non-existent. South American countries, such as Brazil
and Argentina, and Pacific Rim countries, such as Korea, Taiwan
and China, fit this category.149
As a consequence, many
companies do not even file patent applications in these countries
and, when they do file, companies have very low expectations that
they could enforce the patent to prevent infringing activities.150
Therefore, these countries are viable places for U.S.
147
But see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006); see also supra
note 19 and accompanying text.
148
See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (pts. 1–3); 32 I.L.M. 605 (pts. 4–8) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
149
See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685 (2002).
150
See generally id.
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pharmaceutical companies to outsource early stage drug research.
Indeed, some U.S. companies have turned to research
organizations in Taiwan to conduct early stage drug research.151
The second situation where harmonization between the United
States jurisprudence, as applied to early stage drug discovery, and
that of the rest of the world falters is in considering countries
where patent laws are strong, enforcement is good and predictable
but the laws or jurisprudence exempt certain research activities
from patent infringement. Typically, this occurs in industrialized
countries that have experienced the emergence of a global and
knowledge-based economy and therefore place supreme
importance upon technological advancements in society. In these
countries, the use of patented subject matter to improve or advance
scientific progress is paramount to protecting the rights of the
innovator to exclude all uses of the patented inventions. Several of
these countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan,
expressly recognize an experimental use exemption in their
statutory law.152 Those same countries have also generally read
the statutory experimental use doctrine broadly in their
jurisprudence.153
This section will examine the laws of three such countries or
regions—Canada, the European Community and India. These are
by and large the three most active jurisdictions for outsourced U.S.
pharmaceutical research. It is known that these jurisdictions that
are apt to be more liberal than the U.S. in permitting early stage
research even in the face of patents. It is these jurisdictions that
are thus the most fertile destinations for continued and future U.S.
outsourcing of early stage drug research.

151

See Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.N.J. 2002)
(holding that the importation of reports containing the results of patented assays
conducted in a laboratory in Taiwan did not constitute patent infringement because the
diagnostic information provided to U.S. customers did not constitute a product made by a
process under section 271(g)).
152
Duffy, supra note 149, at 718 n.111.
153
Id. at 718.
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A. Canada
The Canadian Patent Act includes a statutory exemption from
infringement that is similar in some ways and very different in
others to that of the U.S. section 271(e)(1) safe harbor
exemption.154 The Canadian provision, like section 271(e)(1),
excludes from infringement activities that are for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information for drug
approval.155 However, the provision is much more expansive than
section 271(e)(1) in that it provides that the submission of
information can be under any law of any country.156 The U.S.
provision is limited to submissions under U.S. federal laws which
regulate the manufacture of drugs or veterinary biological
products.157
This distinction is important. In the United States, only
activities reasonably related to the submission of information to the
FDA or other federal agency are within the safe harbor. Therefore,
activities solely directed to approval outside the U.S. and not part
of the U.S. application to obtain approval to market are infringing.
By contrast, in Canada, the activities can be directed at approval in
any country, whether or not they are also used to support approval
in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that the
purpose of the regulatory exemption is to allow generic
manufacturers to work with the patented invention, and generate
data to the extent necessary, to facilitate lawful market entry in any
country.158 The Canadian exemption, thus, can be used to conduct
research and generate data in Canada that will later be used solely
and exclusively for submission to a foreign regulatory agency,
such as the FDA.

154

The Canadian exemption, intended to meet NAFTA requirements, was derived from
the U.S. provision and adopted shortly before the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in the
United States. It is often referred to as the “early working” exemption.
155
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(1) (1985) (enacted 1993, ch. 2, § 4; amended
2001, ch. 10, § 2).
156
Id. The language broadly states “any law of Canada, a province or a country other
than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.” Id.
157
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2001).
158
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2005] S.C.C. 26.
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Similar to the U.S. safe harbor exemption, however, there are
some restrictions on the type of data that is “reasonably related” to
the development and submission of information under Canadian
law. In Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,159 a federal trial court
held that activities relating to obtaining a provincial formulary
listing for a medicine were not exempt from infringement under
the “early working” exemption of section 55.2(1).160 In rendering
its verdict, the court rejected the notion that an application for a
listing on the provincial formulary was reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under law. Rather,
the court reasoned that the purpose of the formulary listing is to
preferentially enhance access to a market and not to regulate the
“use or sale of any drug product” as required by the exemption.161
This judicial construction of the reasonableness of the activity
related to regulatory approval is comparable to the objective reality
standard employed in the United States.162
While the limits of the statutory exemption have not been
extensively tested in Canadian courts, a few recent cases have
continued to expand the broad judicial reading of the exemption.
For example, in Abbott Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of
Health),163 the court held that the use of a substance that was being
produced at an intermediate stage of a process in drug development
but would not be submitted for regulatory approval itself was
exempted from infringement under section 55.2(1).164 Likewise,
material that was routinely taken as samples during testing and
which incorporated but did not constitute the patented drug product
itself was deemed to be non-infringing use under the early working
exemption.165 The court held that section 55.2(1) is sufficiently
broad so as to encompass intermediate lots of incoming raw
159

[2002] 20 C.P.R. 454.
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (1985). In Canada, strict price controls are maintained in
part by direct provincial funding of drug costs. A provincial formulary lists
pharmaceutical products for which reimbursement is provided for residents on a
provincial drug plan.
161
Pfizer Canada, [2002] 20 C.P.R. 454.
162
See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
163
[2006] F.C. 120 (Can.)
164
Id.
165
Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [2006] F.C. 524.
160
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material “directed in one way or another” to the purpose of
obtaining permission to sell the end product in Canada and the
U.S., “even if such material is never sold and is ultimately
destroyed”.166 Based on these broad judicial constructions,
therefore, Canada’s early working exemption could likely be
invoked by U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms for just that: early
working-stage drug research on patented inventions for purposes
that are “reasonably related” to the development and submission of
information for FDA approval.
In further support of early stage drug research, the Canadian
Patent Act has an additional provision following the early stage
exemption that says “for greater certainty,” the exemption does not
affect any exception to infringement that exists at law in respect of
acts done: (i) privately and on a non-commercial scale; (ii) for a
non-commercial purpose; or (iii) in respect of any use,
manufacture, construction or sale of the patented invention solely
for the purpose of experiments that relate to the subject matter of
the patent.167 This provision served to codify the pre-existing
common law research exception for experimental use in Canada.168
No case law exists on the distinctions and applications of this
section, perhaps because the Canadian common law research
exemption is itself so incredibly broad.
In Canada, the common law research exemption consists
essentially of a wholesale “fair dealing” exemption from
infringement.169 This doctrine allows the widespread use of
166

Id. at ¶¶ 156–58.
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 55.2(6) (1985).
168
Sheldon Burshtein, Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement in Canada,
BLAKE’S BULLETIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. REPORT, Oct. 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.blakes.com/english/publications/IP/IP-October2005.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2006).
169
Micro Chem. v. Smith Kline & French Inter-Am., [1972] S.C.R. 506. This seminal
case involved experiments to enable commercial production of a product for future
compulsory licensing and laid the groundwork for a near limitless experimental use
exemption. The Supreme Court stated: “Patent rights were never granted to prevent
persons of ingenuity exercising their talents in a fair way. . . . if there be neither using nor
vending of the invention for profit, the mere making for the purpose of experiment, and
not for a fraudulent purpose, ought not to be considered within the meaning of the
prohibition.” Id. at 519–20.
167

HELM_FORMATTED_AUTHEDITS_102706

192

10/30/2006 11:39:20 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. 17:153

patented inventions for bona fide experimentation, which includes
all of Judge Newman’s philosophies and more: experimenting to
establish that the invention works, to improve upon the invention,
to better understand the invention, to find a new use for the
invention, etc.170 More recently, it has been held that any use of an
invention that does not proceed beyond the “experimental and
testing phase” is non-infringing.171 Therefore, in Canada, neither
the use of patented inventions to obtain information to be used for
a regulatory approval process, nor the use of patented inventions
for the purpose of experimental or testing activity is an infringing
use.172 Canada, thus, appears to be a fertile and hospitable country
in which to outsource early stage basic drug research that is
potentially infringing in the United States.
B. European Community
The 1975 Community Patent Convention (“CPC”) signified an
effort by the member states of the then European Economic
Community to bring their laws relating to patents into
conformity.173 Article 31 of the CPC provides for a statutory
exemption from patent infringement that encompasses both the
U.S. common law and safe harbor exemptions in one.174 It states
that rights conferred by a patent shall not extend to “(a) acts done
privately and for noncommercial purposes; or (b) acts done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented
invention.”175 Although the CPC is not currently in force, it
nonetheless carries weight. Various individual member states of

170
European Econ. Cmty.: Plenipotentiary Conference on the Cmty. Patent art. 31,
Dec. 15, 1975, 15 I.L.M. 5 (now Article 27(b) of the revised CPC 1989) [hereinafter
CPC].
171
Dableh v. Ontario Hydro, [1996] 68 C.P.R. 129.
172
See Burshtein, supra note 168. See also Judith Robinson, Presentation on Canadian
Patent Law at the Biotechnology Industry Organization 2006 Annual International
Convention (Apr. 12, 2006).
173
CPC, supra note 170.
174
Id.
175
Id.
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the European Community have implemented several of its
provisions in their national laws.176
While different member states have construed the above
exemption in different ways, most courts addressing the issue have
acknowledged that the experimental purposes of subsection (b)
need not be totally divorced from any commercial purpose.177 The
degree to which the courts have exempted acts having a
commercial purpose, however, has widely diverged across member
states. Notably, the two most influential European jurisdictions,
the U.K. and Germany, stand the farthest apart in their
interpretations of the scope of their respective experimental use
exceptions.
In the U.K., the leading case regarding the experimental use
exception is Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. & Another.178
In this case, Stauffer sought to vary an injunction to allow it to
practice under Monsanto’s patent for the purposes of carrying out
field trials with an infringing herbicide and relied on subsection
60(5)(b) of the 1977 U.K. Patents Act to do so.179 The Court
struck a compromise in the context of Stauffer’s activities. It ruled
that experimentation conducted on Stauffer’s premises was
protected by subsection 60(5)(b), even if it had a commercial
purpose, as long as it was carried out to discover something
unknown, i.e., to test a hypothesis, or to find out whether
something will work in specific or different conditions.180
However, Stauffer’s activities conducted elsewhere, “in order to
amass information to satisfy a third party” were not covered by the

176

For example, both the U.K. exemption, contained in section 60(5)(b) of the Patents
Act 1977 and the German “experimentation privilege,” contained in Section 11 No. 2 of
the German Patents Act 1981, were taken nearly word-for-word from the CPC.
177
See infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
178
[1985] R.P.C. 515 (C.A. (Civ. Div.)).
179
Section 60 of the U.K. Patents Act provides a statutory definition of direct and
indirect patent infringement in subsections 1 and 2, respectively. Subsection 5 exempts
activities, as recited in the CPC, that are “done privately and for purposes which are not
commercial” or “done for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the
invention” from such infringement. Id. at 535–36.
180
Id. at 542.
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experimental use exception.181 In so holding, the court expressly
held Stauffer’s experiments with the patented herbicide for the
purpose of obtaining marketing approval for a competing identical
product to be infringing. The U.K. is, thus, one of the few
countries that has taken a narrower approach than the U.S. with
regard to its research exemption in the regulatory approval area.
In Germany, by contrast, the two leading cases that have
shepherded in a broad experimental use exception are, aptly
named, Klinische Versuche (“Clinical Trials”) I and Klinische
Versuche (“Clinical Trials”) II.182 In Clinical Trials I, the
defendants were engaged in clinical trials to find new uses for a
patented drug containing the active substance interferon-gamma.183
The Federal Supreme Court held that the clinical trials were
protected by the “experimental purposes relating to the subject
matter of the patented invention” language of the German
experimentation privilege.184 In so holding, the Court reasoned
that the statutory provision makes no qualitative or quantitative
limit on the experimental acts.185 It thus cannot matter whether the
experiments are used only to scientifically verify the statements
made in the patent or to obtain further research results, and
whether they are employed for wider purposes, such as commercial
interests.186
Clinical Trials II buttressed the above holding. It exempted
from infringement clinical experiments with a patented
erythropoietin (“EPO”) that sought to specifically distinguish that
EPO from the one then on the market and to obtain approval to
market the modified EPO.187 This holding solidified the broad
181

Id. The location of the activities was likely not important. Rather, the intent of the
activities—to find out new information or to merely convince a third party to allow
marketing—was the important factor.
182
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] May 18, 1995, Klinische
Versuche (Clinical Trials) I, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Clinical Trials I];
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 17, 1998, Klinische Versuche
(Clinical Trials) II, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Clinical Trials II].
183
Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. 623.
184
Patentgesetz [Patents Act], Dec. 16, 1980, BGBl. 1981 I 2, § 11 no. 2 (F.R.G.).
185
Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. 623.
186
Id. at 639.
187
Clinical Trials II, [1998] R.P.C. at 423–24.
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applicability of Germany’s experimental use exemption. It allows
third parties to test patented inventions for the express purpose of
obtaining approval to market their own products if one purpose of
the tests is to learn something new. The Clinical Trials II decision
resonates with the U.S. holdings that read “solely” out of the safe
harbor statute.188 The German Court did not concern itself with
whatever additional motivations might exist or whatever purposes
the obtained results would ultimately serve beyond the actual
experimental purpose of the acts.189 Ultimately, in Germany, as
long as the experiments are directly aimed at obtaining new
information, the research is likely to be exempt without regard to
its industrial purpose.190
As suggested in the above-noted cases, both U.K. and German
courts are likely to exempt from infringement tests to discover new
information. Beyond that, the courts will look to the underlying
purpose of the experiments. In the U.K., preclinical experiments
conducted to obtain regulatory approval to market will not be
permitted.191 In Germany, however, these experiments are broadly
exempt from infringement and data obtained therein may plainly
be used to obtain marketing approval and advance science alike.192
In terms of early stage drug research, European countries that veer
with Germany on the broad exemption side will be preferential
locations for outsourcing. At present, these countries include
Belgium, France, and Italy.193 In the future, this group may
expand.
The European Union’s Parliament and Council has adopted a
Directive on the Community Code relating to medicinal products
for human use, which specifically provides for an exemption from
patent infringement to “improve the operation of the marketing
authorization procedures” and conduct the necessary studies and
188

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Clinical Trials II, [1998] R.P.C. at 431.
190
See Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. at 645.
191
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., [1985] R.P.C. 515 (C.A. (Civ.
Div.)).
192
See, e.g., Clinical Trials I, [1997] R.P.C. 623.
193
Michael Gilbert, Presentation on European Patent Law at the Biotechnology Industry
Organization 2006 Annual International Convention (Apr. 12, 2006).
189
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trials needed to obtain marketing authorization—the so-called
“EU-Bolar” provision.194 Although the impact of this Directive on
the patent laws of member states is not yet clear, it is likely to
render the European Community an even more attractive offshore
partner for early stage preclinical and clinical pharmaceutical
research.
C. India
Like many developing countries, India maintains fairly weak
patent laws in order to provide relatively inexpensive products to
its citizens and provide a favorable infrastructure for local facilities
of multinational corporations.195 In an international arbitrage game
of sorts, India is offering competitive contract research services
and technology transfer programs for industrialized countries, in
the hope that the Indian economy will profit in return.196 Indeed,
many multinational companies have found it highly profitable to
outsource various portions of their research operations to India197
and, in turn, India’s economy has posted an average growth rate of
more than 7% in the decade since 1994.198
194

Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34 (EC).
See Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical
Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, 4 (1995).
196
See generally id.
197
See, e.g., DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS GLOBAL
ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 99, DREAMING WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050 (Oct. 2003),
available at http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf.
198
The India Nuclear Deal: Implications for Global Climate Change: Testimony before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong. (July 18,
2006) (statement of David G. Victor, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology,
Council on Foreign Relations), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11123/
india_nuclear_deal.html. Currently, it is estimated that anywhere from one-half to twothirds of all Fortune 500 companies are outsourcing to India. Stephanie Overby, Inside
Outsourcing in India, CIO MAGAZINE, June 1, 2003, available at http://www.cio.com/
archive/060103/outsourcing.html. The most popular services for outsourcing include
rendering software programming services and performing clinical trials for
pharmaceutical companies. See Watch Out India! China Wants to Be Outsourcing
Powerhouse Too, YAHOO! NEWS, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060908/tc_afp/china
economybusinessitoutsourcing_060908110643 (last visited Sept. 13, 2006); Arun Bhatt,
Clinical Trials in India: Pangs of Globalization, 36 INDIAN J. PHARMACOLOGY 207, 207
(2004), available at http://www.ijp-online.com/article.asp?issn=0253-7613;year=2004;
volume=36;issue=4;spage=207;epage=208;aulast=Bhatt.
195
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The Patents Act of 1970 governs current Indian patent law.199
The Indian Patents Act not surprisingly includes a statutory
exemption from infringement that is much broader than that of the
U.S. section 271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption. The Indian
provision is similar to the U.S. safe harbor in that it excludes from
infringement, activities for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information for drug approval.200
The Indian provision is much broader than the U.S. safe harbor and
similar to the Canadian early working exemption in that it provides
that the submission of information can be under any law of any
country.201 Moreover, unlike the U.S. safe harbor exemption and
the Canadian early working exemption, there are no judicial
restrictions on the type of data that is “reasonably related” to the
development and submission of information under Indian law. 202
In further support of early stage drug research, the Indian
Patents Act also includes an experimental use exemption. The
exemption provides that any patented machine or apparatus or
patented process or any article made by the use of a patented
process “may be used, by any person, for the purpose merely of
experiment or research including the imparting of instructions to
pupils.”203 There is no jurisprudence construing this provision.
However, Indian courts would likely consider the following three
elements in construing the breadth of this statute: (a) the so-called
Golden Rule: the literal meaning of the statute; (b) the statement of
objects and reasons of the statute (i.e. the legislative history); and
(c) the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions.204 Considering these
factors, an Indian court would be likely to construe the above
exemption broadly and without a limit to working on the subject
matter of the invention.

199

The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; India A.I.R. Manual (1979), vol. 27 [hereinafter
The Indian Patents Act].
200
Id. at § 107(A).
201
The language broadly states “any law . . . in India, or in a country other than India,
that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.” Id.
202
Himanshu Kane, Presentation on Indian Patent Law at the Biotechnology Industry
Organization 2006 Annual International Convention (Apr. 12, 2006).
203
The Indian Patents Act, supra note 199, § 47(3).
204
Kane, supra note 202.
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There is also no distinction in the Indian Patents Act between
the use of patented inventions in the course of research as
distinguished from the use of patented inventions for a commercial
purpose. Therefore, under Indian patent law, no infringement
liability attaches for the use of a patented invention in research for
commercial purposes. Fundamentally, Indian courts tend to
encourage and maintain a continuous flow of research and
innovation to support their rapidly growing economy. Indian
courts “lean against monopolies.”205 They seek to accelerate the
pace of research, discovery and growth in their services sector.206
Overall, the legal and business climate of India makes it another
appealing country in which to perform early stage basic drug
research that may be patent infringing activities in the United
States. The recent and rapid development of “Genome Valley” in
Hyderabad is direct evidence of this phenomenon.207
V. A NEED FOR INCREASED HARMONIZATION
“The patent system has become sand rather than lubricant in
the wheels of American technological progress.”208 This statement
expresses the frustration of those who believe that U.S. power and
leverage are declining in view of an unresolved tension between
the legislative intent and the judicial application of the Patent
Laws.209 Indeed, recent U.S. decisions on patent infringement in
drug research have created a quandary that may end up forcing
205

Niky Tasha India Pvt. Ltd. v. Gadgets Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 1985 Delhi 141.
See, e.g., WILSON & PURUSHOTHAMAN, supra note 197. The growth rate of India’s
service exports in 2002 was 8% in comparison to 5% worldwide and its services sector
accounts for more than half of the country’s overall Gross Domestic Product. Much of
the rise in the service sectors is attributable to the growth of India’s information
technology and industrial research markets. See Economy for the Month, Indian
Economy, ECONOMYWATCH.COM, http://www.economywatch.com/economyoverview/oct
2005-economy.html#s (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
207
Genome Valley consists of a large biotechnology hub that advertises itself as a stateof-the-art center providing all stages of research, training, collaboration and
manufacturing activities for biotechnology companies worldwide. See Genome Valley,
http://www.genomevalley.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
208
Adam B. Jaffee, A Patent System on Trial: Innovation and Its Discontents, 70 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 709, 709 (2005).
209
See id.
206
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U.S. companies to outsource a majority of their early stage
research.
At present, some pharmaceutical companies are
addressing these challenges with “product sourcing solutions,”
which euphemistically refer to going offshore. Other smaller
research-based companies and academic institutions are simply
using patented technology without a license and informally
invoking a de facto broad research exemption.210
This self-help response of the drug and research industries to
the patent situation is perhaps understandable. The current
jurisprudence fundamentally fails to recognize how drug research
is done. Pre-clinical testing and the early stage screening of
compounds to find a lead candidate are part and parcel of
development and the approval process. U.S. courts have perhaps
paid too little attention to the regulatory approval scheme in their
jurisprudential reasoning. Given that the FDA requires an
incredible amount of preclinical research to be done before a new
drug compound will be approved,211 the courts (with increased
instruction from Congress) need to recognize and help establish a
means for keeping this value-added research in the United States.
Yet, in that endeavor, the courts still need to encourage global
expansion of the industry and the patent laws and to provide an
appropriate value for research tool screening patents and
methodologies. This seeming Gordian knot is something the
Supreme Court, perhaps understandably, side-stepped in Merck
KgaA v. Integra LifeSciences I Ltd.212
It would be a failure of the patent system if corporate research
efforts were shunted to offshore sites merely to evade U.S. patent
infringement. This costs jobs and hurts the economy. More
importantly, the patent laws and the jurisprudence construing them
should not incentivize companies to locate the most valuable
intangible aspects of their business outside the United States.
Congress should pay attention to the public policy considerations
that have led many other countries to expand the research
exemption to patent infringement, far beyond that which U.S.
210
211
212

See generally Walsh et al., supra note 26.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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courts have done. Preferably, the courts or the legislature could do
this by expanding the breadth of the safe harbor exemption to
provide a more explicit and useful exemption to patent
infringement and thereby encourage pharmaceutical companies to
conduct early stage drug research in the United States.
Given the inevitability of globalization, a harmonized patent
regime that encompasses an expanded safe harbor research
exemption for early stage drug research may well be the remedy.
Without it, the trend toward exporting research to offshore
locations could accelerate and the race to the bottom, lowest
common denominator, will proceed at the great expense of the
healthcare and economic infrastructure of the United States.
A. Proposals for Reform
A broadening of the safe harbor exemption coverage would
provide enhanced convergence with and predictability in the global
market. It would also enable drug companies and other researchers
to better plan the operations of their businesses and to decide how
best to conduct such early stage drug research work. Yet, it would
still encourage globalization because there would be no artificial
barriers to the industry and its research.
The proper scope of the safe harbor exemption to infringement,
however, cannot be set in a vacuum. Because a broadened
exemption will effectively tear down protectionist scaffolding and
devalue the worth of research tool patents, some accommodation
must be given to the developers of these important properties. As
indicated earlier, research tool companies make important
contributions to drug research.213 Any market-wide depreciation in
the value of these tools will reduce the likelihood that the research
tool industry will grow and this will disadvantage global drug
development in the long term.
There are no easy solutions. Nonetheless, efforts should be
made to find remedies to treat research tools in a principled,
cooperative manner, as an alternative to the traditional adversarial

213

See supra notes 14 and 22 and accompanying text.
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process of patent infringement litigation.214
Goodwill, for
example, plays a strong role in multinational companies and could
be capitalized upon to generate growth and investment in the
research tool industry. One prospective remedy could include
some sort of tax-based incentive for pharmaceutical firms to
participate in “goodwill” programs that would invest a portion of
the firms’ revenues in future research and development programs
at research tool companies. Such an allocation of revenues would
benefit that industry as well as the drug industry, which needs
those tools for ongoing research.
Large drug companies might well be amenable to such
programs, when viewed as an opportunity cost. Rather than
making tax payments on divested research operations and on the
subsequent transfers of intangible assets into the U.S., drug
companies could instead invest that income in a program that
would fund domestic research tool operations and then receive
profit-enhancing tax deductions for their investments. These
offerings would in turn help compensate the research tool
companies for their contribution to the early stage research that
was performed under the safe harbor exemption in the United
States. Accordingly, the investment rate of any program could be
comparable to the royalty payments that the company would have
made had the research not been exempted from infringement or
moved offshore.
This type of a solution would serve to better protect the
consumer, as the drug research would now be conducted using
helpful research tools in the United States and thus under the
assiduous watch of U.S. regulatory agencies. It would also be
214
Models in other industries could provide some guidance, for example, the
compulsory licensing scheme in copyright law, where the government requires users to
pay royalties into a common fund for the privilege of retransmitting certain copyrighted
broadcasts. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (2000). Another model would be Advance Pricing
Agreements (“APA”) that are used to remedy transfer pricing disputes in tax law. An
APA involves a forward contract between the U.S. government and a taxpaying entity
(e.g., a multinational drug company), by which both parties agree to a transfer pricing
method for the company’s tax payments in advance. This allows the company to obtain
certainty as to part of its future tax burden. See Gustafson et al., TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 625, 667–681 (West Group Publishing 2001).
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economically effective, in that the drug industry’s prior use of the
research tool would contribute to its subsequent value. Goodwill
programs could therefore allocate funding in a manner
commensurate with the worth of the specific tool or company, i.e.
as a percentage of the present value of the future earnings of the
drug that was developed, in part, through the use of that tool.215
B. International Trade Considerations
However, globalization means that individual measures in
individual countries cannot affect the value of research tools in the
global marketplace. A contextual mechanism would still be
needed to counter any practice that would stifle the research tool
industry in the global marketplace. For example, if U.S. drug
companies continued to outsource their early stage research after
an expansion of the safe harbor exemption in order to avoid
making the appropriate payments to the goodwill programs (or to
otherwise compensate research tool companies), such a practice
would thwart the research tool industry. In this respect, the
jurisprudence involving unfair competition as regulated by the
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) could be of
assistance when considering the extent to which information or
products developed through the use of unfunded research tools
offshore should be equitably allowed into the United States. Any
practice that sought to evade compensating research tool
companies would not constitute patent infringement but would still
be fundamentally unfair to the research tool industry. A claim
predicated upon such facts would potentially fall within the ITC’s
jurisdiction.
The ITC regulates activities of entities that unfairly compete
with U.S. industries in the United States under the Tariff Act of
1930.216 Prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g),217 a U.S.
215

In this manner, the goodwill funding program would resemble an APA in that a
company could determine the relative value of the tool and weigh it to reflect its relative
contribution to the overall profitability of the drug company’s business. Presumably this
could also be done in advance to allow the drug company to better manage its investment
burden.
216
Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 76-515, 54 Stat. 724 (1930), amended by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (1982).
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patent owner’s only legal recourse was to seek an exclusion order
for imported products made by its patented process from the ITC
under the Tariff Act.218 With the emergence of global competition,
opposition to any perceived U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction for
unfair trade has waned and the Tariff Act’s reach has broadened.219
Specifically, section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Tariff Act makes it
unlawful to import into the United States articles that are made,
produced, processed or mined under or by means of a process
covered by the claims of a United States patent.220
The U.S. biotechnology industry has made attempts to seek
relief from the ITC for acts performed abroad. In one of a string of
complaints filed by Amgen with the ITC, Amgen argued that the
Congressional intent of Tariff Act section 1337(a)(1) was to
provide assistance to emerging U.S. industries to compete in a
global marketplace without interference due to unfair acts of
foreign competitors.221 In this case, Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co.
Ltd. was using Amgen’s patented intermediates (DNA sequences
and host cells) outside of the U.S. to import into the U.S. a product,
EPO, that was made using the patented intermediates.222 To
remedy the situation, Amgen sought an injunction, based on unfair
trade practices, to bar the importation and sale of the drug by the
foreign corporation’s U.S. subsidiary (Chugai U.S.A. Inc.).223
217

See supra Part III.C., describing infringement through importation.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) provides for injunctive relief, preventing goods from entering
the United States, and issue cease and desist orders against corporations importing the
goods. Unlike 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), the Tariff Act does not provide for an award of
damages.
219
For a general discussion of the effects of globalization on the aggrandizement of the
U.S.’s jurisdictional reach, see Terry Calvani, Conflict, Cooperation, and Convergence in
International Competition, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1127 (2005).
220
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
221
In the Matter of Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1906
(U.S.I.T.C. 1989). Amgen alleged a violation under section 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (1994),
making unlawful any practice that would destroy or substantially injure an industry in the
United States; or prevent the establishment of such an industry. Id. at 1907 n.4. It is
worth noting that the now thriving field of biotechnology was then in its infancy and
Amgen was then a small company. Its EPO product (EPOGEN®) was the biotech
industry’s first blockbuster and Amgen is now the world’s largest biotech firm and a
Fortune 500 company.
222
Id. at 1908
223
Id. at 1907
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The ITC dismissed Amgen’s complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.224 It stated that section 1337 of the Tariff Act
may be invoked only when process patent claims exist, i.e. those
that actually describe the processes that Chugai performed
abroad.225 On appeal, the Federal Circuit likewise held that that
importation of the drug made from those intermediates was not a
violation of section 1337(a) because Amgen’s product claims did
not cover the process performed overseas. 226 The Federal Circuit
enunciated that section 1337(a) was enacted to prohibit imports
made using a patented process abroad and not to prohibit imports
made by a process abroad that employs a patented article.227
This narrow construction of section 1337(a), however, must be
considered in the context of the broader intent of the statute, which
was to prohibit doing offshore that which could not lawfully be
done in the United States.228 Other provisions of section 1337(a)
restrict, for example, unfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation of articles that may restrain or monopolize trade
or commerce in the United States.229 Currently, if drug companies
decide to outsource their early stage drug research to avoid patent
infringement liability, they may well be engaging in the practice of
unfair trade under such provisions. Likewise, if drug companies in
the future decide to outsource their early stage drug research to
avoid making payments to a research tool funding program or
agency, they might also then be engaging in the practice of unfair
trade under such provisions.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has expanded the ITC’s jurisdiction
to potentially adjudicate and impose liability in such cases. In
Kinik Co. v. ITC,230 the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s holding
that the defenses to patent infringement available under section
271(g) do not apply to infringement actions involving the offshore
224

Id. at 1911
Id. at 1909, 1914.
226
Amgen, Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n., 902 F.2d 1532, 1540 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
227
Id. at 1538.
228
Id. at 1539.
229
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(A)(iii).
230
362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
225
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practice of a patented process before the ITC.231 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that a victim of unfair competition should not be
limited in his or her ability to be remedied by the defenses to
patent infringement.232 Under this ruling, therefore, research tool
companies may be able to obtain relief, based on the unfair
practice of outsourcing early stage drug research to evade either
research tool patents or future payments to a research tool-funding
program, upon importation of the products of those processes or
information developed from them into the United States. This
route might thus ultimately provide an equitable remedy to
counterbalance an expansion of the safe harbor exemption within
the global marketplace, while still encouraging international
expansion.
The bottom line is that the research playing field between the
U.S. and other countries needs to be leveled. An increased
harmonization of patent laws on a global scale will serve to
increase the value of all patents and, in turn, increase the incentive
to innovate and to disclose new technologies and inventions, so as
to ultimately enhance technological innovation in this country and
around the world. This was the rationale put forth in the early
1980’s to support the creation of the Federal Circuit.233 Indeed,
throughout its existence the Federal Circuit has repeatedly invoked
its congressional mandate of promoting “national patent law
uniformity” and has expansively interpreted and defined its
jurisdiction in furtherance of that goal.234 U.S. patents are worth
more today as a result of this change.235
This rationale should thus be used again to achieve a globalized
application of the patent laws to reduce the uncertainty regarding,
inter alia, the scope of enforceability of research tool patents and
to increase the indelible value of innovation in a global market.
231

See generally Richard L. Rainey & Paul M. Schoenhard, Tariff Act and Imports of
Products Manufactured by Patented Processes, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-USA, June 14,
2004.
232
Kinik Co., 362 F.3d at 1362.
233
See e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 5.
234
See Gerald J. Flattmann, Jr. & Krista M. Rycroft, Is Uniformity in Patent Law Still
Achievable?, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 2003, at S6.
235
Id.
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This increased certainty will also serve to sustain the growth of
pharmaceutical research in the United States, and will embrace the
integration of information across borders. A broader read of the
safe harbor exemption to patent infringement and to unfair
competition laws (in view of future research tool funding
mechanisms) will give pharmaceutical companies the ability to
capitalize upon their intangible business assets while allowing
scientific innovation to continue in the United States.

